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1. See Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (1999) for estimates of the utility gain that an egoistic
retiree who does not place any utility value on making a bequest obtains by being able to
annuitize retirement assets.
2. The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Retirement Equity Fund
(TIAA-CREF) is the largest private pension plan, with more than $250 billion in assets.
Among male retirees, 74 percent now choose some period of certain beneﬁts in addition to
a life annuity.
3. This paper provides an estimate of the increased value of the annuity that would be




The Economics of Bequests in
Pensions and Social Security
Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova
One of the apparent advantages of Social Security and of private pensions
is that they provide an annuitized form of retirement income that allows
retirees to avoid “wasting” some of their lifetime accumulation in the form
of unintended bequests.1 In practice, however, individuals generally choose
to forgo the potential gain from full annuitization in order to have the
prospect of providing a bequest with some of their lifetime accumulation.
Fore xample, given the choice between an ordinary life annuity (for the
retireeo rthe retiree and spouse) and a “ten-year certain” annuity that
provides that beneﬁts continue for at least ten years even if the annuitant
dies, most participants in deﬁned contribution TIAA-CREF plans select
the ten-year certain annuity.2 More generally, the participants in virtually
all deﬁned contribution plans choose to bequeath the entire value of their
accumulated accounts if they die before reaching retirement age instead of
committing those funds to an annuity at an earlier preretirement age.3
3714. See Feldstein (1998) and World Bank (1994) for descriptions of the investment-based
systems in a number of countries.
5. These include the explicit proposals that have been put forth by Senators Moynihan
and Kerry, by Senators Gramm and Domenici, and by Senators Gregg and Breaux. The
provision of bequests was also a feature of the two individual account proposals contained
in the report of the oﬃcial Social Security Advisory Council.
6. Rosen, Holtz-Eakin, and Joulfaian (1993) show that moderate-sized bequests increase
signiﬁcantly the probability that individuals will begin entrepreneurial activities.
7. Bequests are, of course, an uncertain way of helping children and grandchildren. An
explicit form of saving to make nonrandom gifts might in principle be a useful supplement
toap ension system with bequests.
Moreover, countries that have adopted investment-based Social Se-
curity programs to supplement or replace traditional pay-as-you-go
(PAYGO) systems also generally provide for bequests both when individu-
als die before retirement and when they die during their retirement years.4
For many people, an attraction of supplementing the existing PAYGO So-
cial Security system in the United States with an investment-based system
is that it would give middle- and lower-income individuals the opportunity
to accumulate wealth and make signiﬁcant bequests. Recent legislative
proposals for investment-based supplements to the U.S. Social Security
program provide for such bequests.5 Thea bility to provide bequests in this
wayi salso regarded as an advantage of using individual retirement ac-
counts rather than a single government fund as a way of achieving an
investment-based supplement to Social Security.
Am e chanism for making signiﬁcant bequests is attractive both to those
who would receive the bequests and those who would make the bequests.
The ﬁnancial assets that heirs receive in this way would, if saved and spent
gradually, allow them to maintain consumption in the face of substantial
ﬁnancial risks, including long-term unemployment, large uninsured health
expenditures, or substantial property losses. In addition, ﬁnancial assets
give individuals the ability to quit an undesirable job and seek new work
or to undertake entrepreneurial activities.6 Thea bility to make such be-
quests to children or grandchildren is appealing to those who would make
them because it provides an opportunity to express generosity at the end
of life (Bernheim and Severinov 1998) and because it oﬀers the “strategic”
advantageo fstrengthening ﬁlial loyalty (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Sum-
mers 1985).
Although it might be argued that individuals who want to make be-
quests could save explicitly for this purpose, it is the lack of foresight and
self-discipline to accumulate for their own old age that justiﬁes mandatory
Social Security pensions. This same inability to do long-term saving can
also justify helping individuals to make the bequests that they would like
to make but lack the ability to achieve.7
Thep rovision of bequests is also a matter of practical program design
in a system of investment-based personal retirement accounts. Although
372 Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova8. About one-third of the total cost of beneﬁts is for the additional beneﬁts for spouses,
survivors, dependents, and the disabled.
retirees could in principle be required to annuitize their accumulated
assets at retirement with no provision for bequests, those individuals who
die before retirement must be allowed to make bequests unless the govern-
ment taxes away the entire value of their accumulated assets at death or
requires that all preretirement saving be invested in the form of annuities
as it accumulates. Foreign experience and the revealed preferences in pri-
vate deﬁned contribution plans in the United States imply that neither of
those would be popular options.
Previous academic analyses of investment-based Social Security re-
formsh avei gnored the possibility of bequests, implicitly assuming that all
saving would be invested in annuities both during working years and after
retirement (see, for example, Feldstein and Samwick 1997, 1998a, b; Kotli-
koﬀ 1996, 1998). In contrast, the present paper examines a variety of pos-
sible options for bequests before retirement and during the retirement
years. Although our calculations use the individual employee as the unit
of analysis, the level of projected PAYGO beneﬁts to which we compare
the investment-based annuities corresponds to the Social Security actuar-
ies’ projections for the beneﬁts of retirees, spouses, survivors, and the dis-
abled.8 Theb equests that we study here are therefore supplementary to
these additional beneﬁts that are speciﬁed in current law.
We examine three types of issues about such bequests. First, we ask how
expensive such bequests would be in terms of the saving rate necessary to
support such bequests without reducing the associated annuities. Alterna-
tively, we ask how much of an annuity reduction diﬀerent bequest rules
would require if the saving rate used to fund the investment-based pen-
sionsw as not raised when bequests were introduced. Next, we examine the
probability distribution of bequests by size and by timing under diﬀerent
bequesto ptions. Finally, we consider the macroeconomic consequences of
bequests on capital accumulation.
9.1 Personal Retirement Accounts and Preretirement Bequests
In an investment-based system, individuals accumulate a fraction of
each year’s wages in personal retirement accounts (PRAs) during working
yearsa nd receive annuities during retirement. The deposits to these ac-
counts may be ﬁnanced by the individuals themselves, by their employers,
or by the government. The deposits may be set at a level that permits the
resulting annuities to fully replace the PAYGO system of beneﬁts or at a
level that only supplements a PAYGO system. The issues of who funds the
accounts and of whether the accounts are intended to replace the existing
PAYGO system or to supplement the existing system are not directly rele-
The Economics of Bequests in Pensions and Social Security 3739. Feldstein and Samwick (1997, 1998b) analyze plans based on employee-employer con-
tributions that would eventually replace the existing tax-ﬁnanced system completely.
Feldstein and Samwick (1998a, 1999) describe a plan to use government deposits in individ-
ual accounts to supplement the beneﬁts that could be ﬁnanced with the existing level of
Social Security payroll taxes. Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick (1999) analyze both types
of plan in a stochastic environment.
10. Saving in PRAs is based on wages up to the maximum earnings taxed under Social
Security. This maximum was $68,400 in 1998.
vant to our analysis.9 The structure of the calculations makes it clear that
the size of the annuities and of the bequests is proportionate to the saving
rate. Although we analyze a level of saving that could fully replace the
existing PAYGO system in the long run, readers can consider the eﬀect of
smaller investment-based programs by a proportionate reduction in all of
our dollar amounts.
In a system with no preretirement bequests, the individual is implicitly
required to buy a retirement annuity with each year’s PRA deposit. The
rate of return on the preretirement saving of those who survive in any
given year is therefore the sum of the ordinary market return on the assets
in the account plus the increased value that results from receiving a share
of the assets of those who died during the year.
More speciﬁcally, consider a cohort of individuals who enter the labor
force at age twenty-one. Let Ns be the number of individuals of the cohort
who are alive and working at age s,l e tws be the annual wage of the repre-
sentative individual in that cohort in year s,l e t be the fraction of wages
contributed each year to the PRAs,10 and let Rs be the investment return
in that year. If bequests are not permitted, the funds that are owned by
those who die at age s are automatically reinvested in the accounts of those
whor e main alive, as they would be in an actuarially fair annuity. During
the preretirement period, those who live to the end of their sth year will
have accumulated (as a cohort) an amount
(1) MR M w N ss s s s =+ + −− () , 1 11 
where Ms is the aggregate PRA balance for the cohort as a whole. A repre-
sentative member of the cohort who survives to age s will therefore have
accumulated











, 11 11 1
11 
where the term ([Ns – Ns–1]As–1)/Ns indicates the amount transferred to each
survivor’s account in year s –1f r o mt h o s ew h odied during that year.
Permitting bequests of the accumulated account balances during the
preretirement years changes this accumulation by eliminating the incre-
ment in equation (2) that comes from the accounts of those who died dur-
374 Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova11. This ratio is selected to correspond approximately to the debt-to-equity ratio of U.S.
corporations so that the rate of return on capital at the corporate level can correspond to the
return to these portfolio investments without considerations of the relative yields on debt
and equity. The 60–40 ratio is also a common ratio used by corporate pensions.
ing the year. The value of the assets of an individual who survives to age t
(and therefore the magnitude of that individual’s bequest if he or she dies
in that year) evolves according to
(3) AR A w ss s s =+ + −− () . 1 11
To assess the magnitude of the potential bequests and the eﬀect ofb e -
quests on the amount accumulated at age sixty-six, we use the cohort of
individuals who are twenty-one years old in the year 1998 and the age-
speciﬁc mortality rates for this cohort as projected by the Social Secur-
ity actuaries in the Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin.
We look at a representative individual in this cohort who has mean age-
speciﬁc earnings in each year, again using the projections of the Social
Security actuaries.
9.2 A Model of Uncertain Investment Returns
Our analysis assumes that the PRA balances are invested in a portfolio
consisting of 60 percent stocks and 40 percent corporate bonds. The accu-
mulation of assets in the PRAs and the annuities and bequests at each age
reﬂect the uncertain returns on these assets.
To analyze this uncertainty, we assume that the PRA portfolio is contin-
ually rebalanced to maintain 60 percent equities and 40 percent debt.11 We
use the Standard & Poor’s 500 index and a Salomon Brothers corporate
bond index as proxies for the stock and bond investments. Both indexes
are assumed to follow a geometric random walk with drift. This implies
that the log returns for each type of asset are serially independent and
identically distributed with given mean and variance. Thus, if pes and pbs
are the log levels of the equity and bond indexes at time s,w eassume
pp u es e s e es =+ + − () 1 
and
pp u bs b s b bs =+ + − () , 1 
where e and b are the mean drift per period in the logarithmic value of
equities and bonds, while ue ~i n dependently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) N (0, 2
e)a n dub ~ i.i.d. N (0, 2
b). The covariance between the stock
and bond returns is eb.
With a continuously compounded 60-40 equity-debt portfolio, the log
The Economics of Bequests in Pensions and Social Security 37512. The bond rate of return is based on the Salomon Brothers’ AAA bond returns, ad-
justed to a more typical corporate bond yield by adding 2 percentage points.
13. This estimate of the administrative cost may be compared with the cost of about 0.2
percent charged now in indexed equity funds by mutual fund companies like Vanguard and
Fidelity. Bond funds generally have lower administrative charges.
levelo fthe overall portfolio would satisfy the following random walk if
there were no additions or payouts:
pp u ss s =+ + −1 
with u ~ i.i.d. N (0, 2). To derive the values of  and 2 we use the lognor-
mal property of the returns.
More speciﬁcally, if * i is the mean return on asset i in level form, the
mean return on the 60-40 portfolio is the weighted average *  0.6 * e 
0.4 * b.B ecause we assume the log returns to be normally distri-
buted, * i  i  0.5 2
i.T his implies that
     +=+ ++ 05 06 05 04 05
22 2 .. ( . ) . ( . ) , ee bb
where

222 03 6 01 6 04 8 =++ ... . eb e b
From these two equations and the measured mean and variance of the log
returns on stocks and bonds, we can derive the log return on the portfolio
and the variance of that return.
TheC enter for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data for the postwar
period from 1946 through 1995 imply that for stocks and bonds the mean
log real rates of return were 7.0 percent and 3.3 percent.12 The correspond-
ing standard deviations are 16.6 percent for stocks and 10.4 percent for
bonds. The covariance of the stock and bond log returns is eb  0.0081.
Takent o gether, these parameters imply an average log real rate of return
on the 60-40 portfolio of 5.9 percent with a standard deviation of 12.5
percent.
In the analysis that follows, we reduce the mean log return from 5.9
percent to 5.5 percent to reﬂect potential administrative costs.13
Although the equation for ps describes the way that the logarithmic
value of the PRA account would evolve during the accumulation years if
there were no external additions, the actual individual PRAs would be
augmented annually by a fraction  of the individual’s wage and, when
there are no preretirement bequests, by the distributed share of the PRA
balances of those members of the cohort who die during the year. These
are shown in equations (2) and (3) above. Since those equations are stated
in level rather than logarithmic form, the value of 1  Rs  exp (rs)w here
rs is the logarithmic rate of return in period s implied by rs  ps  ps1 
us.
376 Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova14. For a more complete analysis of these risk issues, see Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998).
15. The mean wage is the mean of the wage distribution subject to the ceiling on the
taxable earnings for Social Security ($68,400 in 1998) and adjusted for multiple excess wages.
Them ultiple excess wages adjustment accounts for the fact that some individuals who receive
wages from more than one employer may earn less than the taxable ceiling at each job but
that their total earnings may exceed that ceiling.
We use equation (3) to simulate 10,000 evolutions of the PRA values
fore ach year from age 21 through 100, taking into account the mortality
probabilities and the stochastic distribution of returns. Our stochastic sim-
ulations recognize the uncertainty of the future mean return as well as the
annual variations in returns around that future mean. For each of the
10,000 simulations, we begin by drawing a mean rate of return from a
distribution with a mean of 0.055 and a standard deviation of 0.0177, the
standard error or the mean estimate based on our ﬁfty-year sample of
observations. We then generate an eighty-year series of returns that have
this mean and a standard deviation of 0.125.
We assume that individuals save 6 percent of their wages each year in
PRA accounts and that the PAYGO tax declines from the initial 12.4 per-
cent to zero.F or comparison, the Social Security actuaries project that the
current PAYGO tax rate of 12.4 percent will have to rise to more than 18
percent in a purely tax-ﬁnanced PAYGO system in order to provide the
beneﬁts that are promised in the Social Security law. In contrast, we show
in this paper that, with no bequests and a saving rate of 6 percent, the
median annuity at age sixty-seven is 2.05 times the future Social Security
beneﬁts promised in current law (which we call the “benchmark beneﬁts”)
and that there is a 90 percent probability that the PRA annuity at age
sixty-seven will equal or exceed 76 percent of the benchmark beneﬁt.14
Since the benchmark PAYGO beneﬁt replaces approximately 40 percent
of the preretirement wage, the median annuity based ona6p e r c e n tr e -
placement rate would correspond to a replacement rate of 81 percent. The
mean annuity exceeds the median and corresponds to 2.98 times the
benchmark beneﬁts.
9.3 The Distribution of Preretirement Bequests
We now study the annuity ﬁnanced bya6p e r c e n ts a v i n gr a t et os e et h e
eﬀects of mortality risk and investment uncertainty on the distribution of
bequests. Table 9.1 shows the implied distribution of preretirement be-
quests of diﬀerent sizes for individuals who die at diﬀerent ages between
twenty-ﬁve and sixty-seven. These bequests are all based on the potential
experience of a representative individual who earns the mean wage15 and
who makes annual saving deposits of 6 percent of that wage to a PRA.
The distribution of bequest values reﬂects the variation in rates of return
on the assets in the PRAs. Column (1) shows the annual age-speciﬁc






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.16. This is also the mean of the truncated distribution, with all wages at or above the
ceiling truncated as if they are at the celing and adjusted for multiple excess wages.
17. See section 9.4 for a description of the variable annuities.
mortality rates, the probabilities that an individual of that age will die and
leaveab equest. The cumulative probability of leaving a bequest (i.e., the
probability of dying by that age conditional on being alive at age twenty-
one) is shown in column (2).
Them eana nd standard deviation of those bequests, in thousands of
1998 dollars, is shown in columns (3) and (4). For comparison, the corre-
sponding mean wage projected for that year is shown in column (5).16 The
simulation of 10,000 forecasts is used to calculate the probabilities that
the bequest will exceed various multiples of the future mean wage; these
probabilities are shown in columns (6) through (9).
Them eanb equests grow rapidly with age, from just $5,000 for those
who die at age twenty-ﬁve to $128,000 at age ﬁfty, and more than $400,000
for those who die just before retirement. Even by age thirty-ﬁve, the mean
bequesto fa ni ndividual who has had average earnings all his life would
be nearly as large as the average earnings in that year. By age ﬁfty, the
mean bequest is more than three times mean earnings. Recall that this is
with a 6 percent saving rate. If the saving rate were limited to 2 percent of
earnings, as it might be in a system that combines PAYGO and investment-
basedcomponents, these means and standard deviations would be reduced
byafactor of three.
The increasing relative variance of the bequest size (seen by comparing
columns [4] and [3]) reﬂects the fact that the annual returns follow a ran-
domw alk, causing the variance of the return to grow with time. The prob-
ability distributions described in columns (6) through (9) show that those
who die in middle age are increasingly likely to leave bequests that are a
signiﬁcant multiple of the average wage at the time of their death. Thus,
among ﬁfty-year-olds who die, virtually all bequests exceed the average
wage, 76 percent of bequests exceed twice the average, and 48 percent ex-
ceed three times the average wage.
In considering these values, it should be recalled that the cost of provid-
ing these preretirement bequests while maintaining the 6 percent PRA
saving rate is to reduce the funds available to ﬁnance annuities among the
vast majority of individuals who do not die before reaching retirement age.
The payment of preretirement bequests reduces the mean accumulation of
assets at age sixty-six by 14 percent, causing the annuities to decline by
the same percentage. Table 9.2 shows the eﬀecto fp roviding preretirement
bequests on the distribution of the variable annuity payments. We report
the variable annuity payments as a fraction of the “benchmark beneﬁts”—
the beneﬁts promised to each cohort under the Social Security law.17
The ﬁrst three columns show the cumulative probability distributions of
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.annuity payments relative to benchmark beneﬁts for retirees at ages sixty-
seven, seventy-seven, and eighty-seven with no preretirement bequest and
a6p ercent saving rate. The next six columns show the same cumulative
distributions, but for the case in which individuals can bequeath their ac-
counts if they die before age sixty-seven. For this case, we consider PRA
saving rates of 6 percent and 7 percent.
Ther e sults indicate that permitting preretirement bequests does not
signiﬁcantly increase the risk to retirees and that the increased risk can
be fully oﬀset byr aising the PRA saving rate from 6 percent to 7 percent.
With that increase in the saving rate, the risk distribution of annuity pay-
ments with preretirement bequests is essentially the same as the distribu-
tion with no bequests and a 6 percent saving rate. The median beneﬁt
with the 7 percent saving rate and preretirement bequests is 2.08 times the
benchmark beneﬁt level (column [6]), virtually unchanged from the 2.05
times the benchmark value with the 6 percent saving rate and no bequests
(column [2]). The corresponding values at the 10th percentile of the distri-
bution are 0.78 times the benchmark and 0.76 times the benchmark. The
similarity continues at the higher age levels shown in table 9.2.
Thel ogic of the calculation is such that the same 17 percent propor-
tional increase in the saving rate would be suﬃcient for any initial saving
rate. For example, a PRA annuity that is intended to supplement rather
than replace the tax-ﬁnanced retirement Social Security beneﬁts would
produce essentially the same distribution of annuities with either a 2.00
percent saving rate and no bequests or a 2.33 percent saving rate and pre-
retirement bequests.
9.4 Postretirement Bequests
Them a gnitude of potential bequests is increased substantially if retirees
canb equeath some part of their postretirement income as well as their
preretirement accumulation. We consider ﬁrst how a variable annuity sys-
tem would work and then examine a variety of alternative bequest options,
assessing the cost in terms of reduced annuities or increased preretirement
savings needed to produce those bequests. We begin with a life annuity for
the retiree alone and then extend our analysis in section 9.5 to a double
life annuity for the retiree and a spouse.
Our analysis assumes that the postretirement annuity is ﬁnanced with
the same stock-bond mix that the individuals had during the preretirement
years. When there is no postretirement bequest, we assume that the indi-
vidual receives variable annuity payments that adjust according to the
changes in the value of the PRA account balance caused by changes in
market rates of return. More speciﬁcally, in a standard variable annuity
contract, the “baseline” annuity beneﬁt that would be paid at age sixty-
seven( on an annuity purchased at age sixty-six) reﬂects the PRA assets at
The Economics of Bequests in Pensions and Social Security 381the beginning of the individual’s sixty-sixth year, the expected mortality
rates at all future ages, and the assumption that the future return will be
equal to the expected portfolio rate of return (5.5 percent in the current
context). Each year the actual size of the variable annuity payment is in-
creased or decreased from the initial value in proportion to the change in
the market value of the PRA assets relative to the market value that would
have prevailed if the expected 5.5 percent return had actually occurred.
More explicitly, let A66 be the value of the assets that the individual has
accumulated at the beginning of the sixty-sixth year, let R be the expected
real rate of return on the portfolio of assets used to ﬁnance the retirement
annuity, and let ps|66 be the probability of reaching age s conditional on
being alive at age sixty-six. The actuarial present value (APV) at age sixty-














where we assume that all individuals alive at age 99 die at the end of the
100th year. Since the PRA account has assets equal to A66 when the annu-
ityi se stablished, the annual annuity that the individual would receive in
the sixty-seventh year is a67  A66/APV if the expected return of R is actu-
ally realized in the sixty-sixth year. In practice, of course, the actual rate
of return varies from year to year. The annuity payments are adjusted in
proportion to the annual changes in the asset value in such a way that the
accumulated fund of the individuals with survival probabilities ps|66 is ex-
hausted over the thirty-four-year potential retirement period. If Rs is the
actualrateofincreaseoftheassetvalueduringyears,thevalueoftheannu-
ity paid in that year is a67  (A66/APV)([1  R66]/[1  R]). Similarly, the an-
nuitya ta ge sixty-eight reﬂects the changes in the market value of the assets
duringthesixty-sixthandsixty-seventhyears:a68a67([1R67]/[1R])
(A66/APV) ([1R67]/[1R])([1R66]/[1R]).
These annuity payments leave no room for postretirement bequests in
the sense that, for the birth cohort as a whole, the annuity payments be-
tween ages 67 and 100 just exhaust the aggregate value of the assets that
had been accumulated at age sixty-six. It is possible, however, to reduce
each annuity payment by some factor k and provide for a bequest at the
time of the retiree’s death. The value of k will depend on the particular
bequest rule. We now consider two of the many possible types of possible
bequest rules: (a) rules that combine actuarial life annuities and N-year
certain payouts, and (b) a residual balance bequest rule that provides a
lifetime annuity but also a bequest equal to the original accumulated PRA
balance at the time of retirement (A66) supplemented by the increases in
the nominal account value resulting from investment returns until the time
of death and reduced by the sum of the actual annuities paid to the retiree.
Our use of a variable annuity (i.e., one in which the annuitant takes the
382 Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova18. In practice it would, of course, be possible to have a portion of the funds in a ﬁxed
annuity, so that a ﬁxed dollar payment at death could be promised.
risks associated with investing in a stock-bond portfolio) precludes be-
quest rules that promise a ﬁxed dollar payment at death.18
Table 9.3 compares the costs and beneﬁts of the diﬀerent postretirement
bequest rules. All of the options are assumed to include full preretirement
bequests. The basic PRA saving rate in these simulations is 6 percent of
wages.
The ﬁrst row corresponds to the case (studied in section 9.3) in which
there is a preretirement bequest but no postretirement bequest. With the
6p ercent saving rate, the mean value of the annuity at age sixty-seven in
10,000 simulations is equal to 2.57 times the benchmark Social Security
beneﬁt in current law; this is shown in column (2). The corresponding
median annuity, shown in the ﬁfth column of table 9.2, is 1.78 times the
benchmark beneﬁt. The annuity reduction factor (column [1]) is the con-
stant proportionality factor, k,b yw h i c hthe speciﬁed postretirement be-
quest reduces all annuity beneﬁts relative to the beneﬁts that would be
paid with the preretirement bequest but no postretirement bequest. By
deﬁnition, k  1f or the “No Bequest” option of the ﬁrst row. The “Re-
quired PRA Saving Rate” shown in column (3) is the saving rate required
to have the same mean annuities at each retirement age as the option with
no postretirementb e q u e s tb a s e do na6p e r c e n ts a v i n gr a t e(i.e., 6.0/k).
9.4.1 Ten-Year and Twenty-Year Certain Annuities
In private pension plans, a popular alternative to a pure life annuity is
an option that provides for a minimum number of years of annuity pay-
ments even if the retiree dies during those years. Two common forms are
the “ten-year certain life annuity” and the “twenty-year certain life annu-
ity.”I fthe retiree dies after this speciﬁed period, there is no bequest.
Thep roportional reduction in the regular life annuity that is required to
permitat e n-year certain payment is calculated by equating the actuarial
present value of the regular life annuity (s67 to 100asps|66[1  R](s66))t o
the sum of a ﬁxed ten-year reduced annuity (s67 to 76kas[1  R](s66))a n d
the actuarial present value of the similarly reduced life annuity beginning
eleven years after retirement (s77 to 100kasps|66[1  R](s–66)), where 1  R 
E(er(s))i sthe expected value of the gross return. The value of k calculated in
this way implies that the preretirement saving rate that would be required
to maintain the initial annuity distribution is simply the basic saving rate
divided by the value of k because that raises the PRA assets at the time of
retirement by the factor 1/k.
Ther e sults for ten-year and twenty-year certain annuities are shown in
the second and third rows of table 9.3. A ten-year certain payment reduces
the available annuity by only 6 percent (i.e., by the factor k  0.94 in










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.column [1]). The ability ofa6p e r c e n tr e d u c t i o ni nt h ea n n u i t yp a y m e n t
to compensate for the fact that the annuity will be paid for at least ten
years eveni fthe retiree dies before age seventy-seven reﬂects the relatively
low mortality probability during those years. With the basic 6 percent sav-
ing rate, the mean annuity at age sixty-seven is still 2.41 times the bench-
mark Social Security beneﬁt. Achieving the same mean annuity with the
ten-year certain payment as with no postretirement bequest requires in-
creasing the 6 percent saving rate by a factor of 1/k  1.064 to a saving
rate of 6.42 percent (shown in column (3).
The postretirement bequests are separate from the preretirement be-
quests and, for the cohort as a whole, are in addition to them. For any
individual, the mean expected bequest is p(death before age sixty-seven)
* (mean preretirement bequest)  (1 – p[death before age sixty-seven]) *
(mean postretirement bequest.)
Columns (4) and (5) show the mean and standard deviation of the post-
retirement bequests that would be available with the basic 6 percent saving
rate. These bequest values are the present values as of age sixty-seven (dis-
counting at the expected return on the PRA balances) and are reported as
am ultiple of the projected mean wage in the year that the cohort reached
ages ixty-seven ($44,087 in 1998 dollars). The value of 0.52 in column (4)
of the second row implies that the mean of the postretirement bequests in
the 10,000 simulations has a presentv alue as of age sixty-seven of $22,925.
Associated with this mean present value of bequests is a standard devia-
tion shown in column (5). In interpreting this standard deviation, it should
be noted that the distribution is lognormal and therefore not symmetric.
With the adjusted saving rate that is needed to maintain the same distri-
bution of annuity payments that would prevail with no postretirement be-
quests—a saving rate of 6.42 percent—the value of the bequests rises by
the same proportional amount. The mean bequest shown in column (6) is
0.56 times the mean wage in the year that the cohort reaches age sixty-
seven.
At wenty-year certain rule means that the annuity payments continue
after deathu ntil at least the time when the retiree would have been eighty-
seven years old even ifh ed i e sb efore then. The extra ten years of guaran-
teed payments at a time when the mortality rate is increasing rapidly re-
quire a further reduction in beneﬁts of 11 percent of the standard beneﬁt,
from 94 percent of the standard annuity with the ten-year certain rule
to 83 percent with the twenty-year certain rule. However, even with this
reduction, the 6 percent PRA saving rate implies a mean annuity at age
sixty-seven that is still 2.13 times the benchmark Social Security beneﬁt.
To oﬀset this decrease and achieve the same annuity distribution that
would occur with no postretirement bequest requires increasing the 6 per-
cent saving rate to 7.26 percent.
Columns (4) and (5) show the mean and standard deviation of the pres-
The Economics of Bequests in Pensions and Social Security 385entv alue of postretirement bequests that would be available with the basic
6p e r c e n ts a ving rate, reported as a multiple of the mean wage in the year
that the cohort reached age sixty-seven. The mean present value bequest
as of age sixty-seven with the 6 percent saving rate is $66,571; this rises to
$80,679 if the saving rate is adjusted to 7.26 percent.
9.4.2 Residual Balance Annuities
An alternative type of bequest rule would give heirs the actuarial value
of the remaining lifetime annuity payments at the time of the retiree’s
death. This is equivalent to the original account value at the time of retire-
ment (A66)r educed by the sum of the annuities actually paid and supple-
mented by the increases (or decreases) in the nominal account values re-
sulting from the investment returns. More explicitly, if the retiree dies at
age s after receiving the annuity payment kas the bequest would evolve
according to As  (1  Rs1)As1  kas.W er efer to this as the residual
balance bequest and show the main eﬀects in the fourth row of table 9.3.
Ther equired value of k canb ecalculated by equating the actuarial pres-
entv alue of the regular life annuity (asps|66[1  R](s66))t othe sum of the
actuarial present value of the reduced annuity (kasps|66[1  R](s66))a n d
the actuarial present value of the bequests ([p(s1)|66  ps|66]As[1  R](s–66))
where p(s1)|66 – ps|66 is the probability of dying at age s and 1  R  E(er(s))
is the expected return on the PRA balance. We ﬁnd that k  0.71, a 29
percent reduction in the potential annuity levels relative to providing only
preretirement bequests.
Even with this reduction, the PRA program with a 6 percent saving rate
would provide a mean annuity that is 1.83 times the benchmark Social
Security beneﬁt (column [2]). To maintain the “no postretirement bequest”
probability distribution of annuity income while giving the “residual bal-
ance” bequest requires raising the saving rate from 6.0 percent to 8.5 per-
cent (column [3]).
Turning from the annuities to the bequests, with the 6 percent saving
rate the present value of bequests as of age sixty-seveni s2.49 times the
mean wage in the year that the cohort reaches age sixty-seven, or $109,777
in 1998 prices. With the saving rate raised to 8.5 percent to maintain the
original distribution of retirement annuities, the mean present value of the
bequests rises to $154,745.
9.5 Bequests to Spouses and Double Life Annuities
Bequests to spouses are diﬀerent from intergenerational transfers. Social
Security provides additional beneﬁts to surviving spouses whose own
beneﬁts are relatively low, and private pension plans in the United States
are required to continue annuity payments to surviving spouses unless a
spouse speciﬁcally relinquishes his or her right to a beneﬁt.
386 Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova19. Recall that our basic analyses (e.g., Feldstein and Samwick 1998a; Feldstein and Ran-
guelova 1998) assume that beneﬁts will be provided, as speciﬁed in current law, to spouses,
survivors, and the disabled as well as to retirees. The bequests that we study in this paper
would be supplementary to these additional beneﬁts already provided in current law. Note
that, with a PRA saving rate of 6 percent, the beneﬁts that we calculate are not of the amount
that must be set aside to pay the disability and survivor beneﬁts called for in current law.
Operationally, a fraction of the 6 percent PRA saving could be set aside to purchase survivor
and disability insurance while still ﬁnancing the retirement beneﬁts cited in this paper.
There are a variety of possible arrangements for providing annuity bene-
ﬁts toasurviving spouse.19 The simplest of these is a double life annuity.
This provides that the variable annuity continues to be generated in the
same way until both the retiree and the retiree’s spouse have died. The cost
of providing such a double life annuity depends on the sex of the primary
beneﬁciary (the “retiree”) and the diﬀerence in age between the retiree and
the spouse. For our calculations, we assume a male retiree who is two years
older than his wife.
With this assumption, the probability that the spouse is alive at the time
of the retiree’s death decreases from 0.89 if the retiree dies at age sixty-
sevent o0.75 if the retiree dies at seventy-seven and 0.51 if the retiree dies
at eighty-seven. Our simulations imply that replacing a single life annuity
with a double life annuity reduces the annuity that can be ﬁnanced with
our6 0–40 stock-bond investment mix by 20 percent. Alternatively, main-
taining the same annual payments if the single life annuity is replaced
with a double life annuity requires raising the saving rate by 25 percent,
increasing, for example, from 6.0 percent to 7.5 percent.
Thed ouble life annuity can also be extended to permit bequests to other
heirs after the retiree and the retiree’s spouse have both died. Using the
residual balance method of calculating bequests means permitting other
heirs to receive the actuarial value of the remaining account balance. This
is equivalent to reducing the original account value at the time of retire-
ment (A66)b ythe sum of the annuities paid to the retiree and spouse and
supplementing it with the increases in the account values resulting from
the investment returns. If the “second to die” dies when the retiree would
have been ages, the bequest would be As,w h i ch evolves from A66 according
to As  (1  Rs1)As–1  kas.T able 9.4 shows the probability of bequest
to nonspousal heirs, the mean bequest, and the standard deviations of the
bequests at each age as well as the overall mean and standard deviation of
the bequests. These bequests are shown as multiples of the mean earnings
of employees in each year. The projected mean earnings (in 1998 dollars)
in each year are shown for comparison. The analysis for bequests in all
years (shown in the last row of the table) converts the bequests into mul-
tiples of mean covered earnings in the year that the bequest is received.
Thep robability of a bequest shown in column (1) includes preretirement
as well as postretirement bequests. In both situations, the other heirs re-
ceive bequests only if both the husband and wife have died.
The Economics of Bequests in Pensions and Social Security 387Thep robability that an heir other than a spouse receives a beneﬁt in
any year is low until the primary retiree is quite old, because until then the
probability that at least one spouse is alive is quite high. With the 6 percent
saving rate assumed in these calculations, the mean bequests when they
occur are quite substantial, rising from $126,000 (3.4 times average indi-
vidual annual earnings) at age ﬁfty to $324,000 (7.2 times average individ-
ual annual earnings) when the second member of the couple dies at the
time that the primary annuitant would have been seventy years old. This
amount is six times the annual individual earnings in the year of bequest.
The ﬁnal row of table 9.4 shows that the mean bequest is 5.1 times the
average covered earnings in the year that the bequest is made.
Theb equests described in table 9.4 assume a couple with only a single
earner, an increasingly rare situation in the American economy. When
both members of a couple work, a double life annuity with residual be-
quests oﬀers more attractive prospects to other heirs. We analyze in table
9.5 the situation for a two-earner couple, both of whom have double life
annuities. In this analysis, both members of the couple receive a PRA
annuity while they are alive. When the ﬁrst member of the couple dies, the
remaining member of the couple receives both annuity payments. At the
death of the remaining member, the other heirs receive the actuarial value
of the remaining balances in both annuities.
Thes peciﬁc distribution of such residual balance bequests depends on
the ages of the couple and on the amounts that each earns. As an example,
we consider a couple in which both members earn the average wage and
in which the wife is two years younger than her husband. We assume that
the preretirement bequest that is paid to a surviving spouse is consumed
Table 9.4 Postretirement Bequests to Nonspousal Heirs with a Double
Life Annuity
Probability Standard Mean
of Bequest to Mean Deviation Earnings
Nonspousal Heirs Bequest of Bequest ($000)
Age (1) (2) (3) (4)
30 0.000008 0.5 0.1 31
40 0.000032 1.5 0.6 34
50 0.000097 3.4 2.1 37
60 0.000550 6.9 5.8 41
70 0.004024 7.2 8.6 45
80 0.020680 6.3 10.1 50
90 0.075238 4.5 9.8 55
All 5.1 10.0 42
Notes: The PRA account earns a mean return of 5.5 percent with a standard deviation of
12.5 percent; see text for more details. The employee in these calculations is a male with a
spouse who is two years younger. Bequests are stated as multiples of the mean earnings in
the year of the bequest. Mean earnings, shown in column (5), are in constant 1998 dollars.
388 Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova20. Recall the distinction introduced in the previous paragraph between PRA bequests
and other bequests.
during his or her lifetime. Although we understand that additional
amounts may be bequeathed, for the purpose of this analysis we count as
ab equest to other heirs only the amounts that come directly from PRA
accounts or annuities and not funds that were accumulated by the dece-
dent from previous bequests received or in other ways. Table 9.5 shows, as
af unction of the age that the husband iso rwould have been, the probabil-
ityo fabequestt on o nspousal heirs, the mean and standard deviation of
those bequests, and the average earnings in that year.
Thep robability of a residual balance bequest to other heirs during the
preretirement years is higher in a two-earner couple than in a single-earner
couple because a wife who is the second to die has a PRA balance to
bequeath. In a single-earner couple, the other heirs receive a preretirement
PRA bequest only if the husband is the second to die.20 Similarly, a widow
who dies in the postretirement years and who has had no labor earnings
of her own has no PRA account if her husband died before age sixty-
seven. She therefore leaves no PRA bequest. In contrast, a widow who
had her own earnings history can leave her annuity to her nonspousal heirs
even if her husband died before she died.
Thee xpected value of the bequests is also higher in the two-earner case,
because on the death of the second spouse the heirs can receive the resid-
ual balance of two accounts per couple if both spouses die after age
sixty-six.
Table 9.5 Postretirement Bequests to Nonspousal Heirs: Two-Earner Couples with
a Double Life Annuity
Probability Standard Mean
of Bequest to Mean Deviation Earnings
Nonspousal Heirs Bequest of Bequest ($000)
Age (1) (2) (3) (4)
30 0.000015 0.5 0.1 31
40 0.000065 1.6 0.7 34
50 0.000218 3.6 2.2 37
60 0.001129 7.2 6.1 41
70 0.007612 9.6 11.4 45
80 0.036794 10.5 16.7 50
90 0.131211 7.7 16.6 55
All 7.1 15.5 42
Notes: The PRA account earns a mean return of 5.5 percent with a standard deviation of
12.5 percent; see text for more details. Husband and wife in these calculations both earn the
mean age-speciﬁc covered earnings in each year. Bequests are stated as multiples of the mean
earnings in the year of the bequest. Mean earnings, shown in column (4), are in constant
1998 dollars.The age refers to the age of the husband in the year of the bequest.
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marginal product of capital, the level of wages, and the tax rates required to fund government
purchases of goods and services. An updated version of this analysis, using Social Security
projections of 1998, is presented in Feldstein and Samwick (1999).
22. The eﬀecto fbequests on national saving depends also on what the individual bequest
recipients do with the received amount.
9.6 Macroeconomic Consequences of Bequests
An investment-based Social Security system in which the PRA deposits
represent incremental saving alsor aises the national saving rate. An exami-
nation of the potential magnitude of the increased capital accumulation is
presented by Feldstein and Samwick (1998a), who estimate the evolution
of PRA assets in an economy in which population and wage earnings grow
between the years 1995 and 2070 according to the projections of the Social
Security actuaries. The Feldstein-Samwick analysis assumes that 2 percent
of the covered wages of each employee are deposited in PRAs each year,
that these assets earn a real nonstochastic 5.5 percent rate of return, and
that individuals receive actuarially fair annuities beginning at age sixty-
ﬁve.T here are no bequests in either the preretirement or postretirement
years. With these assumptions, the aggregate balance in the PRA accounts
reaches 38 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by the year 2030 and
79 percent of GDP by the year 2070.21
The extentt ow hich this accumulation of PRA assets raises the nation’s
capital stock depends on the way in which other private and public saving
responds to the introduction of investment-based Social Security. We ig-
nore these issues here and focus only on the way in which the introduction
of bequests would alter the accumulation of PRA assets.22
Although our framework of analysis in the current paper does not per-
mit us to calculate the eﬀects of bequests on aggregate PRA assets in each
year, we can show the impact of bequests on PRA asset accumulation by
comparing the mean PRA asset valuesf or representative individuals of
diﬀerent ages under the diﬀerent bequest assumptions. The ﬁgures in col-
umn (1) of table 9.6 are the cohort’s aggregate PRA accumulations with
no bequests. These ﬁgures, based on a saving rateo f6p e r c e n t ,a r ei n
billions of 1998 dollars and are shown as a function of the age of the co-
hort members. The cohort’s PRA assets rise from $54 billion at age thirty
to $978 billion at age sixty before beginning a postretirement decline dur-
ing the next decade. These aggregate accumulation values correspond to
amounts per cohort member of approximately $16,000 at age thirty and
$280,000 at age sixty.
The eﬀecto fp reretirement bequests is shown in column (2). Each ﬁgure
in this column shows the assets at the identiﬁed age as a percentage of the
baseline assets shown in column (1). Most of the reduction in assets occurs
at ages close to retirement. At age ﬁfty, the mean PRA balance is 96.7
390 Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelovapercent of the no-bequest baseline amount. This declines to 86.6 percent
by the time of retirement and remains at that level because no further
bequests are made. These ﬁgures imply that the net reduction in total PRA
assets of all generations at a point in time is likely to be less than 10
percent.
At e n-year certain annuity (in combination with the preretirement be-
quests), shown in column (3), implies a decline in PRA assets at all ages.
Until retirement age, the decline is the same as with the pure preretirement
bequest, because the ten-year certain annuity is only available after retire-
ment age. Between ages sixty-seven and seventy-seven the PRA assets de-
cline more slowly because the annuity payout rate is reduced in order to
ﬁnance the ten-year certain option. The diﬀerence, however, is not large.
After age seventy-seven the assets are smaller than with only the preretire-
ment bequests because of the larger average annuity payout between ages
sixty-seven and seventy-seven and the corresponding reduced annuity to
be ﬁnanced after age seventy-seven.
With the twenty-year certain option, the PRA assets actually rise rela-
tive to the baseline amount during the early retirement years, because in
those years the reduced level of the annuity outweighs the twenty-year
certain payments made to the heirs of those who have died. By age eighty-
seven, however, the annuity payments must be lower than in the ten-year
certain case (to compensate for the greater number of years of guaranteed
beneﬁts), and therefore the assets that support those annuities must be
lower.
Finally, the residual balance bequests imply higher assets at all ages
because of the much more substantial reduction of the annuity payments.
Unlike the ten-year certain and twenty-year certain annuities, in the resid-
ual balance case the assets do not decline in old age because the annuity
Table 9.6 PRA Assets as a Percent of the No Bequest Baseline with Diﬀerent
Bequest Rules
No Bequests Preretirement 10-Year 20-Year Residual
Baseline ($billion) Bequests Only Certain Certain Balance
Age (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
30 54 99.5 99.5 99.5 99.5
40 181 98.5 98.5 98.5 98.5
50 446 96.7 96.7 96.7 96.7
60 978 92.1 92.1 92.1 92.1
70 917 86.3 87.5 92.6 91.2
80 546 86.3 80.7 106.0 106.8
90 179 86.2 80.6 71.2 116.7
Notes: Baseline PRA Assets are based on a PRA plan with no bequests. Dollar amounts
arei n1998 dollars. The other bequest options all assume the preretirement bequests. The
postretirement bequests shown in columns (4) through (6) are based on single life annuities.
The Economics of Bequests in Pensions and Social Security 391beneﬁts remain unchanged, and the expected value of the residual balance
bequest increases as the assets accumulate.
In general, therefore, permitting bequests is likely to reduce PRA assets
by relatively small amounts. Even these modest declines overstate the
eﬀect of bequests on total capital accumulation because they do not take
into account the eﬀecto fb equests on non-PRA assets that are accumu-
lated as a result of PRA bequests. Moreover, if the PRA saving rate is ad-
justed to stabilize the annuity levels, the net eﬀects of bequests on asset ac-
cumulation would be positive.
9.7 Conclusions
Experience in private pension plans and recent policy discussions about
Social Security suggest that some form of bequests is likely to be part of
any enacted investment-based Social Security reform. This paper provides
a ﬁrst examination of the potential magnitudes of such bequests and of
their eﬀect onr e t irement annuities and asset accumulation.
Investment-based PRAs would accumulate substantial funds, some of
which would be distributed as bequests. We analyze the eﬀects of a 6 per-
cent saving rate, a level that would provide a nearly 80 percent probability
that the annuity payments at age sixty-seven are at least equal to the future
beneﬁts promised in current Social Security law. (Pure PAYGO ﬁnancing
would require a payroll tax rate of more than 18 percent to ﬁnance the
same beneﬁts.) With such a saving rate, the cohort reaching age twenty-
onei n1998 would expect to accumulate more than $50 billion by age thirty
and more than $900 billion by age sixty, all expressed in the prices of 1998.
These amounts are about $16,000 per employee at age thirty and $300,000
at age sixty.
The most likely form of bequest is the preretirement bequest, made
when employees die before retirement age. The alternative to such be-
quests would be a 100 percent tax at death on all accumulated PRA assets
or an administratively complex system of mandatory annuitization of all
savings as they accumulate. Providing such bequests reduces the funds
available for postretirement annuities by about 16 percent or, equivalently,
requires a one-sixth increase in the PRA saving rate (e.g., from 6 percent
to7p ercent) to maintain the same level of postretirement annuities as
would be possible with the mandatory annuitization of all savings.
We also analyze a variety of postretirement bequest options. The least
costly option that we consider is adding a ten-year certain feature to the
life annuity, thereby providing a bequest whenever the retiree dies before
ages eventy-seven. This would reduce annuities, relative to providing only
preretirement bequests, by about 6 percent. The most costly option that we
consider would provide a bequest equal to the remaining actuarial value of
392 Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelovathe PRA annuity at the time of death and would require reducing all annu-
ities by about 29 percent. These reductions in the annuity levels could be
avoided by increasing the PRA saving rate by a corresponding amount.
The sizeo ft h eb e q u e sts and the impact on asset accumulation are pro-
portional to the PRA saving rate. The results in this paper are based on a
PRA saving rate of 6 percent, a level of saving that could in principle
eventually substitute completely for the PAYGO tax and ﬁnance all bene-
ﬁts with a margin of safety. The PRA saving rate required for the more
realistic task of stabilizing the current 12.4 percent payroll tax rate, while
maintaining the beneﬁts projected under current law, would be about 2
percent. The pension and capital accumulation eﬀects of such a mixed
system would be about one-third of the amounts shown in this paper.
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Comment Jonathan Skinner
One positive inﬂuence of a privatized Social Security system is that con-
tributors feel a proprietary interest in their accumulating accounts. This
encourages greater responsibility for prudent investment choices and helps
contributors to view Social Security payments as saving rather than a bur-
densome tax. Developing a proprietary interest, however, also raises the
potential forr esentment in the event of an early death—why, the contribu-
torm ight think, should the government conﬁscate my investments? Un-
der the current system, of course, there is little or no sense of ownership,
so the idea that beneﬁts cease at the time of death does not appear quite
so unfair.
Feldstein and Ranguelova have anticipated this hurdle faced by a pri-
vatized Social Security system and have proposed a sensible and economi-
cally sound solution—that contributors be allowed to bequeath some of
their accumulated beneﬁts in the event of an early death. The purpose of
the paper is to quantify how much a modest bequest package would cost,
either in terms of increased payments into the Social Security system or
in terms of reduced beneﬁts. The major result is that the costs of setting
up such a program are quite modest, often costing less than 1 percentage
point of additional saving. The analysis is very carefully performed, and I
have no reservations about the approach that they take or the parameter
values they use to estimate the costs of bequests.
What I will argue in these comments is that Feldstein and Ranguelova
are, if anything, too modest in presenting their case for bequests, or for
some kind of lump-sum award near death. The potential tradeoﬀ between
annuities and a payoﬀ near death holds for any Social Security system.
That is, enrollees in the current Social Security system may be willing to
give up modest levels of beneﬁts, or pay slightly more in taxes or contribu-
tions, so as to enjoy the insurance value of lump-sum payments in the
event of early death or other contingency. Indeed, there is a death beneﬁt
equal to $255 under the current Social Security system, apparently de-
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though the Feldstein and Ranguelova results are clearly designed to dove-
tail with a more thoroughly developed Social Security plan (as in Feldstein
and Samwick 1997; Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick 2001; or Kotli-
koﬀ 1996), the striking results shown in their paper raise a more general
issue about the optimal payout schedule for any annuitization program.
It is useful as a starting point to think about a simple life-cycle model
wherein the only uncertainty is the time of death. Then the individual
would prefer to annuitize all retirement wealth, and the optimal Social
Security beneﬁt should replicate the optimal postretirement consumption
stream. If the optimal consumption path increases over time (for example,
because the interest rate exceeds both the discount rate and the annual
probability of dying), then the Social Security payment should increase
over time, and conversely. In this idealized story, Social Security provides
complete annuitization of retirement consumption, and it is smooth, with-
out death beneﬁts or any contingency payment. Even in the case in which
Social Security provides incomplete annuitization, as is true for the vast
majority of Social Security beneﬁciaries, the optimal Social Security pay-
ment could be a smooth consumption payment that might even increase
over time in real terms to provide the maximum degree of insurance
against living to an old age.
As Feldstein and Ranguelova and others have observed, the world is
nots imply a certainty life-cycle model. People do have preferences to leave
bequests, whether through life insurance policies at younger years, or by
choosing “ten-year certain annuities at retirement (through TIAA-
CREF), which pay ten years of beneﬁts, either to the primary enrollee or
to the designated heir, following an early death.
It is useful to distinguish, as Feldstein and Ranguelova do, between be-
quests designed for younger decedents and bequests for older postretire-
ment decedents. For younger contributors, grafting an actuarially fair term
life insurance with low administrative costs onto a privatized Social Secu-
rity system is not very expensive as long as the probability of death is low.
The beneﬁts could also be substantial, particularly if the decedent has not
adequately provided for his or her spouse and children; Bernheim et al.
(1999), for example, suggest that many households hold life insurance cov-
erage that would prove inadequate should the principal earner die.
It is important to note that Social Security already has in place survivor-
ship beneﬁts that partially address this problem for younger decedents. In
1996, an average of $487 per month was paid to some 1.9 million depen-
dent children of deceased enrollees, for a total of about $11 billion annu-
ally (U.S. House of Representatives 1998). Paying out an annuity may be
more useful for supporting children, since a single lump-sum life insurance
payment could be spent rapidly by a surviving parent or stepparent, leav-
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and Skinner 1999), making the bequest option that much less costly.
2. This raises a related question: Why don’t enrollees simply save for a bequest on their
own? The answer may be linked to the justiﬁcation for a forced saving program such as Social
Security; perhaps there is a problem with making intertemporal plans that are dynamically
consistent among some households, as in Laibson (1997) or Akerlof (1991).
ing little or nothing for the child’s support. On the other hand, their pro-
posed insurance plan does not replace the dependent children program,
but supplements it; the revenue projections in the Feldstein, Ranguelova,
and Samwick (2001) proposal allow for full continued funding of the pro-
gram for dependent children and spouses.
The issues surrounding bequests among postretirement elderly people
are somewhat more complicated, as the cost of such a program can be
quitel arge, given the much higher mortality rates in this population and
hence the much higher costs of providing a death beneﬁt.1 Nor is there
quite the same perceived need for bequests beyond spousal support, since
the children of the decedents are typically either at their peak earning
capacity or nearly retired themselves. Nevertheless, Feldstein and Ran-
guelova have touched upon a legitimate desire for retirees to leave be-
quests, and as long as they are willing to pay more in taxes, or reduce their
annuitized beneﬁts, it is reasonable to consider providing such an option.
Evidence from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances certainly appears
to support the view that the demand for leaving a bequest is strong. Of a
broad sample of individuals asked, more than half replied that they
thought leaving a bequest is important or very important (Dynan, Skinner,
and Zeldes 2000). If anything, the fraction desiring to leave a bequest was
slightly higher among high school dropouts than among college graduates,
so the interest exists across broad socioeconomic groups. Thus, it might
appear that providing an option to leave a bequest provides exactly what
contributors want.2
A somewhat diﬀerent view, however, on the motives for saving comes
from respondents to a question in the 1983–1989 Survey of Consumer
Finances panel with respect to their motives for saving. Of retired house-
holds, 43 percent replied either “in case of illness” or “emergencies” as
their most important reasons for saving, with less than 5 percent men-
tioning saving for their children. How can these two survey responses be
reconciled? Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2000) suggest a model in which
saving while old serves a dual role of both guarding against future cata-
strophic or end-of-life expenses (with a small probability p)a n dthe more
likely function of providing a bequest for heirs (with a higher probability
of 1  p).
Them e ssage from these survey questions, therefore, suggests a more
complicated story than a simple bequest motive. If a Social Security sys-
396 Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelovatem wanted to replicate, through forced saving, what people said they were
saving for, then the nature of the beneﬁts might be quite diﬀerent from a
bequest. Perhaps beneﬁciaries would prefer an option that allows them
to spend down some of their bequest balances for nursing home care or
medication should they be stricken with serious illness. Perhaps a program
that protects them against inﬂationary erosion of bonds or other assets
that they rely upon for retirement income would be another option. An
elderly couple in which one person is battling Alzheimer’s disease may
prefer to access some of their cash balances instead of passing them along
to their heirs.
Instituting such a program would raise all sorts of diﬃcult questions in
terms of who is and is not eligible to access the bequest balances and
how to design the program to prevent abuses or fraud. Particularly for a
privatized Social Security system with personal accounts, a simple bequest
program might be most practical, particularly if private markets arise that
allow beneﬁciaries to borrow against such payments. However, the general
point remains that if the Social Security system, privatized or not, wishes
to expand beneﬁts beyond the standard option that provides for a smooth
levelo fannuity payments, it should determine why people save, and design
beneﬁts that capture, as closely as possible, those motives for saving.
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Stephen C. Goss noted that, although Social Security does not provide a
lump-sum bequest, it does provide child survivor beneﬁts as well as bene-
ﬁtsf or a spouse caring for a child. The present value of these beneﬁts to
at wenty-seven-year-old with average earnings, a spouse, and two young
children is between $250,000 and $300,000. These beneﬁts are intended to
replace lost income. If the twenty-seven-year-old had life insurance or
other assets, these monthly Social Security survivor beneﬁts would allow
a family to maintain its existing assets. In this situation there is little
diﬀerence between a lump sum beneﬁt and an annuity.
Gary Burtless believed that there is not a very strong public policy case
forb equests. Why should a labor tax be imposed on everybody to fund
bequests? Why should old age and survivor beneﬁts be linked to bequests
to people that may not have any ﬁnancial need for these bequests? Clearly,
this is a very ineﬃcientw ay to reduce the Gini coeﬃcientf or the ﬁnancial
wealth distribution. The authors responded that there are two reasons to
study bequests. First, people seem to like bequests, because they do not
want the wealth in their government-sponsored individual accounts to be
taken away by the government when they die. Perhaps more importantly,
there has been signiﬁcant interest in bequests by the policy makers consid-
ering Social Security reform, so whether or not bequests are a good idea,
it is important to understand how they would work. In particular, a senator
may believe that increasing the individual account contribution rate from
6p ercent to 7 percent is a reasonable price to pay for having a system with
bequests, and providing policy makers with the information necessary to
make those choices is valuable.
Stephen Zeldes worried about the availability of annuities in private
markets. If the level of annuitization is reduced in the current system or a
system with individual accounts, will people be able to purchase similar
annuities from ﬁnancial institutions? Is there a large adverse selection
problem in the private sector? Mandatory annuities in the Social Security
system may be actuarially more fair than annuities oﬀered by insurance
companies.
Jeﬀrey B. Brown found the residual balance annuity to be a somewhat
puzzling design feature. If a retiree’s estate receives the full remaining actu-
arial balance of the account after death, then the retiree’s resources are no
longer really annuitized. Instead, the retiree is simply amortizing the ac-
count balance at a variable rate over the maximum remaining life span.
One implication of this amortization approach is that the choice of the
maximum life span has a more important eﬀecto nthe income that is avail-
able to retirees than true life annuities, the future payments of which are
discounted by survival probabilities. In this paper, the account balance is
amortized over thirty-three years, which may not be long enough, given
398 Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelovathat more and more people are living beyond age 100. A higher maximum
life span would further reduce the income that is available from these re-
sidual balance annuities.
Eytan Sheshinski indicated that ﬁrst-best eﬃciency could be achieved
using life insurance markets. After retirement, when most of the uncer-
tainty about income has unfolded, individuals want a bequest of a particu-
lar size. A ten-year certain (any year certain) annuity merely oﬀers a ran-
dom bequest, because the size of the bequest depends upon when the
individual dies. Bundling Social Security and bequests seems to have prob-
lems. Why not allow people to choose the size of their bequest by purchas-
ing life insurance with some percentage of their Social Security beneﬁts?
In addition, it could be interesting to examine simulations in which be-
quests before retirement are an increasing function of age. Such a program
would deﬁnitely be more cost-eﬀective and might be sensible ifb e q uests
become more important as people age.
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ mentioned a reason to avoid committing to life
insurance. Because income uncertainty is largely unresolved for a retired
individual’s children, the size of the bequest motive could be changing
signiﬁcantly over time. Since life insurance and annuity markets have ad-
verse selection problems and administrative costs, many people might de-
cide to share risk with their children and avoid the private sector com-
pletely.
Martin Feldstein emphasized a more basic problem that underlies all
discussions of bequests. The standard models indicate that people will
choose to buy some combination of life insurance and annuities. Clearly,
the decision-making procedure is poorly understood because the actual
behavior observed is quite diﬀerent. People care about leaving something
to the next generation, but they also care about how they make this be-
quest. For example, people might desire to bequeath wealth in the same
way that it was bequeathed to them. The recent stock market rise has
made universities, museums, and so on very rich, yet that has not stopped
donorsf romc ontributing after these organizations met their goals for capi-
tal accumulation. People care about the process.
The Economics of Bequests in Pensions and Social Security 399